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 As a phenomenon of radicalism, right-wing extremism (RWE) is a multifaceted 
ideology, disruptive political movement, expression of hyper-conservative traditional social 
beliefs and values, and a disturbing form of fringe violence due to its byzantine and parochial 
nature. Western militaries struggle with RWE in their ranks because they reflect the societies 
which they serve. This qualitative comparative case study looks at the strength of anti-
extremism policies designed to address RWE in the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, 
and Germany. Using content analysis, it examines military regulations, government policies, 
and criminal code to identify shortfalls in existing policy. Using a theoretical process model, 
it evaluates the rigor of each policy to address RWE, evaluates their clarity for use, and 
examines the willingness of each study country to act. Finally, this study uses examples of 
RWE cases from each study country to determine if current policy sufficiently addresses the 
RWE threat. This study makes recommendations on the ideal language a policy should 
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 Western militaries are institutions built upon the consolidation of republican ideals, 
patriotism, and the concept of the unbridled defense of nations and their way of life. As such, 
they are generally more conservative, often slow to change, and frequently nostalgic for a 
time of past martial glory. Because of this conservatism, right-wing extremist (RWE) views 
can sometimes find a convenient foothold within the ranks despite Western militaries’ 
ascription to egalitarianism and a unified principle to serve the good of the people. Likewise, 
as reflections of their societies, Western militaries struggle to manage RWE activity in their 
midst. Presently, with the upsurge of populism throughout the West, growing partisanship, 
and festering social dynamics that cross demographics, religion, sexual identity, and 
socioeconomic lines, RWE is on the rise in Western societies (Koehler 2016; Perliger 2020; 
Wodak 2015). As such, Western militaries are experiencing unprecedented levels of RWE in 
their ranks. This threatens the trust their societies place in them, reduces internal cohesion, 
and ultimately violates the good order and discipline upon which their effectiveness lies 
(Koehler 2019).  
 This comparative case study looks at the strength of anti-extremism policies in the 
United States, Canada, United Kingdom, and Germany designed to address RWE.  To do so, 
it examines the following research question: How effective are anti-extremism policies in 
addressing right-wing extremism in Western militaries? To determine policy effectiveness, 
this study uses content analysis to analyze military regulations, government policies, and 
criminal code to identify shortfalls in existing policy. To validate potential shortfalls, it 
evaluates the rigor of each policy using a process model which assesses the policy’s ability to 




willingness of each study country to follow through and act on known cases of military 
RWE. Finally, this study uses real-world examples of RWE cases in each study country as a 
mechanism to determine if existing policy sufficiently addresses the threat RWE poses in the 
ranks of each country’s military.  
Literature Review 
Right-Wing Extremism as a form of radicalism is a broad field of study across many 
academic disciplines. Research in RWE includes how best to define RWE, which terms 
apply, what typologies clearly portray RWE, and what parameters help explain RWE as a 
psychological behavior, ideology, and output activity. Alongside discussions of RWE 
behavior is a deep field of research into the authoritarian nature of RWE as a form of 
political ideology, as well as discourse, rhetoric, and framing analysis to understand the 
language, context, and intent of RWE perspectives and propaganda. Finally, there is 
significant effort to understand RWE as a manifestation of political violence and terrorism, 
with coinciding research examining how to counter RWE radicalization and violence. 
Despite the scope of existing research, however, there are still gaps in the literature regarding 
the fundamental ways policies designed to address RWE can be assessed as well as how 
RWE promulgates within military culture.   
Right-Wing Extremism Terms and Definitions 
 To begin, research dedicated to RWE uses a variety of terms with researchers often 
adopting a preferred term for the sake of simplicity. This practice treats the host of available 
descriptions to refer to RWE as interchangeable and frames RWE as a collective belief 




he observes within American society, but later in his work, Right-Wing Collectivism, lists a 
scope of terms including “Nazism, fascism, alt-right, white supremacy, white nationalism, 
neo-reaction, [… and] (borrowed from Ludwig von Mises), right-Hegelianism” which he 
presents as completely exchangeable when discussing right-wing activity (2017, 13). This 
scope of terms serves as an ideal starting point for attempting to cast a net across the vast 
field of right-wing research, but his focus on Caucasian forms of ethnonationalist 
supremacism fails to account for the threat of non-Caucasian organizations equally 
represented in the right-wing movement. As such, this study adopts a more general 
application of right-wing ethnonationalist and supremacist terms because ethnic hate and 
racism is empirically unconstrained.  
In addition to a variety of descriptive terms, the field of RWE research also debates 
the definition of RWE. The number of proposed RWE definitions varies widely, something 
which Mudde documented in his formative 1995 study of RWE definitions. Further, 
definitions tend to shift along cross-cultural boundaries because forms of RWE manifest 
disparately across countries. While it is common for studies to claim there is no single 
definition of RWE, Carter (2018) disagrees and asserts there is enough research to determine 
an agreeable set of parameters. In her review of definitions and typological analysis, Carter 
argues consensus exists to propose a minimal definition as, “An ideology that encompasses 
authoritarianism, anti-democracy and exclusionary and/or holistic nationalism” (2018, 174). 
This definition backs away from more specific terms, such as white supremacism, and 
instead uses more rooted forms of supremacist thought such as authoritarianism and 
exclusionary nationalism to capture non-Caucasian and gendered supremacism, while still 




Likewise, Jackson’s definition of RWE is also broad, defining RWE as “an 
amorphous category that includes conservative or regressive forms of extremism based on a 
desire to preserve existing political structures or return to previous structures” (2020, 9). This 
definition is expansive in its scope of extremist strains it can cover, however its focus on 
preserving or returning to past forms of power structures excludes non-Caucasian forms of 
supremacism and nationalism that are present in Western societies (Jackson 2020, 9).  
Meanwhile, definitions of RWE contain cultural nuances specific to the country in 
study. This tendency is evident particularly in German research, which focuses on the fascist, 
supremacist, and neo-Nazi elements of RWE (Koehler 2014, 51), while Canadian research is 
unique in recognizing gender and sexuality (Perry and Scrivens 2019, 4). Because of its 
broad nature, this study uses Carter’s minimal definition as it suitably captures a wider swath 
of RWE activities reflected in the ranks of Western militaries, while remaining flexible 
enough to allow for emergent forms of RWE as the ideology expands and evolves over time. 
RWE Typologies 
  Alongside efforts to define RWE is the task of determining an RWE typology that 
characterizes the scope of existing groups. This again tends to reflect cultural boundaries, as 
not all types are represented across Western societies. Jackson’s typology classifies RWE 
into an overlapping triad of racist, nativist, and antigovernment extremism; he then 
subdivides antigovernment into two subcategories: sovereign citizens and the patriot/militia 
movement (2020, 13). Jackson notes the overlap is due to the blending of contentious 
political and social issues between RWE belief systems (2020, 19).  However, Jackson’s 
typology excludes groups centered on male supremacy, fundamentalist religious beliefs, and 




13). Indeed, Perliger’s counter-typology classifies American far-right groups into “four social 
movement industries: white supremacy, antigovernment, fundamentalist, and pro-life” (2020, 
18). Groups in these categories “embrace xenophobic, segregationist, racist, and 
antidemocratic inclinations” based on ideological commitment to “extreme nationalism and 
nativist sentiments” (2020, 14, 18). However, Perliger’s typology, while presented as broad 
and “maximal,” fails to account for non-Caucasian forms of supremacism but is unique in 
identifying pro-life as a category (2020, 18). Finally, Atkins and Atkins (2011) present a 
complex typology that best captures fundamentalism, arguing for categories divided into 
American white supremacist and neo-Nazi movements; Christian Identity, Christian 
reconstructionism, and other right-wing religious movements; and anti-American 
government extremists. Ultimately, the RWE typology debate plays out strongest in 
American research which reflects the complexity of RWE in the United States, but there is a 
utility to focusing on creating categorical understanding of RWE through representational 
schema. This is because RWE is taking on an increasingly international mold with RWE 
spreading between Western societies, making it necessary and appropriate to apply a schema 
to research examining RWE in countries other than the United States (Perliger 2020, 3).  
RWE and Authoritarianism 
 Perhaps the foremost assessment of RWE within political philosophy is the work of 
Adorno, Horkheimer, and other expatriate researchers from the Frankfurt School and 
Institute of Social Research in the United States and Germany (Weiss 2020, 46; Kiess and 
Decker 2016, 12-13). Adorno and Horkheimer’s collaborative studies on authoritarianism led 
them to coin a variety of analytical terms, including “the authority-bound personality” and 




2020, 50; Kiess, Decker, and Brahler 2016, 13). Meanwhile, Adorno’s 1967 lecture Aspects 
of the New Right-Wing Extremism built the case for viewing right-wing extremism through 
fascist political theory.  
While this lays the foundation to historically associate RWE with fascism, Adorno 
and Horkheimer’s work could be considered dated because it primarily sought to explain 
actual National Socialism during the Nazi era in Germany, and then later tracked resurgent 
sentiment post-war (Weiss 2020, 43-44). However, Tucker (2017) carries the argument 
forward to present day, stating in blunt terms that RWE is a “political ethos that is properly 
identified as fascist” (2). Other contemporary interpretations of RWE’s authoritarian nature 
seek to blend RWE’s political manifestations with elements of behavioral psychology, 
particularly how “anti-democratic attitudes” correlate within individual personalities to 
enable adoption of extreme right-wing views (Kiess and Decker 2016, 13). These 
observational angles, which build off Altemeyer’s (1981) right-wing authoritarianism scale, 
place context on RWE’s authoritarian, ethnonationalist-centric belief structures.        
RWE as a Form of Terrorism and Political Violence 
 The study of right-wing terrorism and RWE as an expression of political violence is 
expansive. Research examines the predispositions of ideological footings for individual 
motivations to crime and violence (Kerodal, Freilich, and Chermak 2016), how right-wing 
terrorism seems to occur in cyclic response to elections and major political developments 
(Johnson 2012, 200), the social identity parameters surrounding the ideas of inequality that 
govern prejudices and drive a syndrome of Group-Focused Enmity (Zick et al. 2008), and 




One aspect of RWE violence that separates it as a form of extremism is the common trend to 
classify acts of violence carried out with RWE motivations as hate crimes (Koehler 2016, 
89), however research increasingly calls for RWE political violence to be viewed as the 
terrorism that it is, correcting the past political motivation to portray RWE as less of a threat 
than other forms of extremism (Koehler 2016; Perliger 2020).  
The Role of Civil-Military Relations 
 While there are civil-military implications, particularly in relation to policy 
enforcement and personnel behavior standards, for any discussion surrounding anti-
extremism policies  in Western militaries, the unique cultural aspects that shape and define 
the bounds of the civilian-military relationship make a full examination of their impacts 
beyond the scope of this study. 
Defining Strong and Effective Policy 
Meanwhile, determining a policy is strong or effective enough can be a highly 
subjective undertaking that may be tinged by political or personal bias, limited experience, 
and cultural influences. However, in order to advocate for a policy review that takes a broad 
view of RWE so as to capture all possible variations of association, activism, and violence 
within a country’s military, this study must address methods for assessing policies – 
specifically for how to determine if a country’s anti-extremism policies and regulations meet 
the criteria for sufficiently addressing RWE. Of note, this study will define the act of 
“addressing” as “having a readiness or capability for dealing (as with a person or a problem) 
skillfully and smoothly” (Merriam Webster 2020).  So, while there are presently no 




a significant body of research into the success, failure, or effectiveness of counter violent 
extremism (CVE) policies.  
Primary within the research on measuring CVE effectiveness, Gielen (2019) conducts 
an extremely thorough review of prevailing CVE policy analysis and advocates that a 
“realist” method of evaluation for CVE policies allows for a “systematic” approach, resulting 
in an advantageous methodology that provides the strongest critical assessment of policies 
(1152). The “realist method” Gielen promotes urges the reviewer to ask a series of questions 
surrounding a policy: “What works, for Whom, in What Circumstances, and How?” (2019, 
1152). Likewise, there is general research into policy strength and effectiveness that aims to 
build methodological frameworks for assessing policies. Begley et al. (2019) suggest 
measuring policy success or failure based on a framework of identifying “targets, aims and 
processes” for a policy that are divorced from “general assessments of achievements” (200). 
This framework builds on McConnell’s (2010) triadic framework of policy as involving 
“processes, programs, and politics” that can be measured along a “spectrum of success, 
resilient success, conflicted success, precarious success, or failure” (345). 
Likewise, when considering the relationship between a policy and its effect, public 
policy research promotes the use of a variety of frameworks and evaluation methods. The 
“ROAMEF” model (“rationale, objectives, appraisal, monitoring, evaluation, and feedback”) 
promotes an evaluation framework that is often used within public health policy to enable 
rational policy development (Charlesworth, Or, and Spencelayh 2016). Similarly, policy 
impact assessments promote an evidence-based approach which attempts to document 
changes, both “potential (ex-ante) and actual (post-ante),” as a form of measuring policy 




effectiveness through types of outcomes, with critical advocates on both sides of a debate 
between a culminative approach, which quantifies inputs, tracks their application, and 
measures outputs as change (Arrow 2006), and the comprehensive approach which calls for 
greater examination of the role of choice and obligations (Sen 2009; Samson et al. 2015, 2).  
Gaps in RWE Research 
 Finally, studies focused specifically on RWE in Western militaries are sparse despite 
a common history of RWE activity and a documented rise of association, sentiment, and acts 
of RWE-motivated violence by service members. Research related to RWE in the military 
tends to focus more on the popularity of RWE amongst veterans, which can be driven by 
overall conservatism, or as Simi, Bubolz, and Hardman (2013) document, potential rifts in 
identity that result from social ruptures with society. Research specifically examining RWE 
activity in the military is highly limited, with more focus on the potential societal impacts 
when RWE is prevalent in military culture. Indeed, Ralston, Motta, and Spindel (2020) 
explore the relationship between the American public and perceptions of RWE in the 
military, presenting concerning findings that RWE’s threat is significantly underappreciated. 
However, the most notable attempts to address RWE in the military are currently amongst 
German researchers, with Bötticher’s (2013) review of German military policies and 
institutional responses to extremism and Koehler’s (2019) report on RWE prevalence and 
military CVE strategies in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany.  
 This study seeks to fill the gap in RWE research focused on anti-extremism policy 
strength (as opposed to CVE strategy efficacy). The difference between the two is important. 
Research on CVE documents successes and failures in various CVE strategies, and 




of policy language to determine if the tools available to control RWE are theoretically sound, 
while using real-world RWE cases as a grounding measure, is a novel approach. This study 
uses this approach to bridge the divide from a strictly CVE review mindset to a pragmatic 
functional analysis perspective.  
Methodology Overview 
 This research study consists of two parts designed to identify and assess the strength 
of existing anti-extremism policy language as measured against a selection of cases involving 
RWE-related infractions by military service members in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and Germany [hereafter referred to as the “study countries”]. Part I is a 
descriptive and summative content analysis of the applicable military regulations, general 
government policies, and criminal codes used to address extremism within the study 
countries’ military populations.  Using these results, the second part of the study applied the 
policy language content analysis to a theoretical three-step process model using six cases of 
infractions to test for policy strength. The study provides recommendations based on the 
outcomes of these process model tests. 
Study Typology 
Based on the typologies identified in the literature review, this study adopts a 
modified version of Jackson’s typology because its minimal construction is the most 
applicable to RWE outside the United States. This study modifies his typology by adding a 
category for fundamentalist extremism and adjusts his racism category to a generalized 
position on supremacism to capture more unique RWE groups, such as the involuntary 




Western militaries. Figure 1, below, provides a schematic representation of the typology used 
for this study.  
 
Figure 1. Proposed Typology of Right-Wing Extremism 
Part I: Process and Purpose 
 Content analysis was used to identify key language indicators within the policies, 
regulations, and criminal code intended to address cases of extremism in a specific study 
country’s military. Content analysis is a technique for analyzing qualitative data of varying 
levels of structure and similarity or dissimilarity enabling the discovery of explicit, latent, 
and symbolic meaning. The study utilized Dedoose™ research analytic software to perform 




code tree intended to identify references to RWE, definitions of extremism or terrorism 
activity, and other pertinent qualitative content, Dedoose™ enabled summative content 
extraction and analysis across the body of documents included in the study. The relevant 
policies, regulations, and criminal code were individually assessed through in-line text 
analysis and analyzed with mixed methodology analytics to isolate any relevant trends, 
patterns, and potential inconsistencies in base documents as compared by study country or 
specific document type.    
Part II: Process and Purpose 
Theoretical Process Model Overview 
This study establishes the framework for the three-step process model by combining 
aspects of Gielen’s realist-driven approach with elements from Begley et al. and 
McConnell’s methodologies, as discussed in the literature review. Specifically, it takes 
Begley et al.’s targets and aims and McConnell’s spectrum of success and constructs a 
framework built on logical questioning. The process model provides a method of assessment 
to test a study country’s policies against a series of “strength questions” meant to identify 
weak, moderate, and strong manifestations of policy language. A process model is ideal 
because it acts as a reasoning system to compare “relative order of magnitude” outcomes of a 
set symbolic value system (Forbus 2008, 364). In this case, the rating system of weak, 
moderate, and strong criterion for language phrasing serves as a reason-based value system 
of pragmatic probabilities. This enables weighted evaluation of each policy and results in a 




The three-step process model, shown below in Figure 2, begins with a “RWE Strain 
Litmus Test” which serves as a starting point for testing the “thoroughness” of a policy.  The 
intent is to determine if the policy under analysis addresses all types of RWE based on the 
schema from Figure 1. The study identifies thoroughness as critical because it provides a way 
to measure whether a policy acknowledges the full scope of the issue. In the context of the 
study, this meant acknowledging the full threat of RWE and not reacting only to a specific 
strain (for example, only supremacism or nativism) while omitting the rest. The implications 
of omission could either be intentional (choosing to exclude a specific type of RWE for 
political reasons, for example), ignorant (failure to include due to lack of cognizance), or 
willfully ignorant (focusing on a specific type of RWE based on presumption of a certain 
type as a greater threat).  
Regardless, the litmus test provides the first line of assessment for determining a 
policy’s strength based on the number of RWE strains it explicitly addressed in clear 
language differentiating between forms of RWE. For example, if a policy stated members of 
the military were prohibited from membership in groups advocating for ethnic superiority, 
anti-Semitism, or gender superiority (supremacism), violence against immigrants or those of 
foreign descent (nativism), violence against those of another religion (fundamentalism), or 
advocating the overthrow of the government (anti-government, militia, patriot movement 
RWE), the study determined the policy clearly differentiated between RWE. The strongest 
policies identified all four strains of RWE, moderately strong policies identified three of the 
four strains of RWE, and the weakest policies focused solely on a specific type of RWE or 
did not define RWE based on typology at all. RWE identification is essential because failing 




the assessed policy, thus leaving a form of RWE room to expand in the ranks of a study 
country’s military.    
The second strength test determines if the policy provides a clear way to act on an 
RWE infraction. This step examines the severity of punishment available to administer, to 
ascertain if there is an adequate mechanism in place or if no pathway exists to handle the 
RWE infraction. Therefore, this strength test appraises the degree of administrative and 
statutory criminal consequences in place to discipline a military member found guilty of an 
RWE infraction. The strongest policies included both legal or criminally punitive actions and 
administrative actions (for lesser infractions), moderately strong policies only included 
administrative consequences, and the weakest policies did not provide for clear consequences 
of any kind and simply rebuked RWE as poor behavior and established a normative standard 
for conduct.   
Finally, the third strength test evaluates whether the organization responsible for 
handling the RWE infraction (for example, the service branch of the member involved, such 
as the U.S. Army) displayed the will to act when an RWE infraction occurred. The purpose 
of this test is to determine if the policy strength was not at fault for addressing an incident but 
instead a culture of non-compliance or poor awareness within the organization. For this test, 
the strongest policies displayed evidence in the case application the organization responsible 
for handling the RWE infraction acted routinely on incidents according to established 
procedural guidelines. Moderately strong policies were those where the responsible 
organization acted but did not comply with established standards. The weakest policies were 




of RWE infractions, regardless of established procedure. 
 
Figure 2. Theoretical Three-Step Process Model 
Policy Testing and Case Application Overview 
 Finally, the purpose of the case application to the process model in part II is to test the 
relevant policy language identified in the content analysis phase against real-world evidence. 
Using examples of military RWE incidents, two per each country included in the study, part 
II determines if existing policy was sufficient for handling the RWE infraction. If the policy 
language or its application was deficient, then adjustments to the actual policy language or 
the implementation of additional parameters addressing behavior-based inefficiencies are 






Case Study Selection and Sampling Process 
 This study involved two separate, purposive sampling strategies used to identify the 
country-level case study bounding parameters with which to examine RWE in the military, as 
well as the RWE infraction cases used to test the theoretical process model. The study 
identified the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany using criterion-
based selection to meet a series of specific requirements. These criteria included: 1) style of 
government as a form of Western constitutional democracy; 2) the country is believed to be 
experiencing a rise in overall RWE activity as a result of nationalist, populist, or other 
authoritarian-driven social sentiment; and, 3) popular news reporting identified RWE 
infractions involving the country’s military; or 4) popular news reporting identified 
significant discussions of proposed changes in policy related to military personnel conduct.  
Since 2015 there has been a rise in populist sentiment in the United States and an 
increase in RWE activity (SPLC 2020). Further, the United States House Armed Services 
Committee’s Subcommittee on Military Personnel held testimony in February 2020 titled 
“Alarming Incidents of White Supremacy in the Military – How to Stop It?” where the Anti-
Defamation League, the Global Project Against Hate and Extremism, SPLC, and other 
government agencies provided in-person and written testimony documenting a trending 
increase in cases of RWE involving military service members across all branches of the 
United States military (House Armed Services Committee 2020).  Likewise, beginning in 
2019, Canada experienced a series of high-profile incidents of RWE involving members of 
the Canadian Armed Forces, while the Canadian military also undertook an expansive update 
in 2020 to its Hateful Conduct personnel policy because of these incidents. Meanwhile, the 




European Union in 2016, with a pronounced rise in populist sentiment. This is accompanied 
by a concerning increase in overall RWE-related activity within the country (The Soufan 
Center 2020). Finally, Germany has experienced a tumultuous level of populist furor as part 
of backlash against the European refugee crisis. Further, Germany’s military had a series of 
scandalous cases of RWE infractions starting in 2019 amongst its special operations forces, 
leading to the disbandment of an entire unit, the Kommando Specialkräfte (Bennhold 2020).     
 Six RWE infraction cases were also identified using critical case sampling methods 
because they provide specific evidence of sufficient detail to enable application of the 
process model strength tests. While the study used certain criteria to reject potential case 
examples, such as those involving veterans, each RWE infraction case was selected because 
enough information regarding the circumstances and procedural handling of the incidents 
were available to the public either through official government statements, or reliable 
investigative journalism.   
Part I: Policy Document Content Analysis  
 The first part of this study is the qualitative content analysis of eighteen policy 
documents: either military regulations, general government policies, or statutory criminal 
code from the study countries. This study selected documents for analysis because they serve 
as anti-extremism policy or guidance, and as such are applicable in relevant circumstances to 
an RWE infraction by a military member of a study country.1 Using Dedoose™ analytical 
 
1 Many codes of military law include broadly applicable general articles, such as Article 134 of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice for the United States, Section 19 of the Manual of Service Law for the United 
Kingdom, and Article 103.60 of the Queen’s Regulations & Orders for Canada that could be used to prosecute 
RWE as an offense against “the good order and discipline” of the military (Joint Service Committee on Military 
Justice 2019; Government of the United Kingdom 2016; Government of Canada 2019). However, the general 




software, this study applied a code tree built to identify primary and secondary tiers of 
content indicators to each document to determine the degree and to what detail each one 
addressed concepts of RWE, extremism, and terrorism.  
Primary content indicators involved direct references to aspects of RWE, including 
definitions of RWE types, activities, and targets. Secondary content indicators included 
references to extremism and terrorism in generalized terms, as well as observations of 
implicit bias and wording that introduced “optionality.” Optionality was a concern because 
these language choices possibly shift the intent and focus of the policy document and could 
impact its proper utilization or enforcement against an infraction. This study defined implicit 
bias language as language that by either specific word choice or argumentative 
presupposition conveyed a prejudiced thought or belief in favor of a singular interpretation of 
a concept of terrorism, extremism, or a foundational ideology of political violence.  An 
example of implicit bias is stating that a form of extremism or terrorism is worse than another 
form, such as claiming Islamist extremism and terrorism is more of a threat than right or left-
wing extremism or terrorism. Optionality is defined as “available to be chosen but not 
obligatory” (Lexico 2020). Stating that a behavior, such as extremism, must be discouraged 
because it does not reflect the values of an organization or the responsibilities of military 
service is an example of optional language. The summary table below briefly outlines the 
 
for a commander to act on initiative and provides only a vague pathway to action for a commander to address 
RWE as a serious offense. Therefore, this study does not assess these articles because of the inherent structural 
challenges these laws present. 
Meanwhile, German military law differs from the other study countries in that the Wehrdisziplinarordnung 
(WDO) or Military Disciplinary Code does not provide a similar general article (“Wehrdisziplinarordnung” 
n.d.). However, §8 (Support for the basic democratic order) and §23 (Misconduct) under First Section Common 
Rules, Duties and Rights of Soldiers, of the Soldier’s Act of 2001 contain language that could serve as means of 




content analysis results for each country against key primary and secondary content 
indicators. Appendix B provides an expanded discussion of the findings.  
Table 1. Content Analysis Summary  
 United States  United Kingdom Canada Germany 
Defines RWE Yes No Yes Partially 
Supremacist Yes No Yes Yes 
             Nativist Yes No Yes Yes 




Partially No No 
 
No 
Articulates Process Partially No Yes No 
None Specified N/A Yes N/A Yes 
Administrative Yes Yes Yes No 
Statutory Partially Yes Yes Yes 
Implicit Bias No Yes No Partially 
Optionality Yes Yes Partially No 
  
Part II: Process Model Testing Results and Case Application 
 
The tables summarize the results of the three-step theoretical process model’s 
application to each study country’s policy documents, followed by tables providing the 
pertinent details of the RWE cases for each country and the results of the case application 
process.     
United States 
Table 2. United States Process Model Summary Testing Results 
 Test #1: RWE Litmus  Test #2: Pathway to Act Test #3: Usage  
DODI 1325.06 
(Military Regulation) 
Moderate Weak / Strong Weak 
AFH-1 
(Military Regulation) 
Moderate Moderate Moderate 
MCO 5354.1E 
(Military Regulation) 
























United States: Case Applications 
Table 3. United States Case No. 1: Staff Sergeant Steven Carrillo 
 
Military Service Type Active Duty, U.S. Air Force 
Date of Infraction(s) May 29, 2020 and June 6, 2020 
Infraction 
May 29, 2020: shot and killed David Underwood in a drive-by shooting in 
Oakland, California; June 6, 2020: ambushed and killed Sgt. Gutzwiller 
and attempted to murder Sheriff’s deputies Spencer, Ramponi, Officer 
Rodriguez, and Officer Estey using firearms and a pipe bomb.  
 
Prior to apprehension, used his own blood to paint Boogaloo movement 
popular messaging on vehicles in the vicinity of his capture (Losey 2020; 
Dazio 2020; Mossberg and Waldrop 2020; California v. Steven Carrillo 
20CR02599 Santa Cruz Superior 2020).  
RWE Group Association Boogaloo Movement 
RWE Ideology Anti-Government, Militia, Patriot Movement 
Current Status 
August 28, 2020: plead “not guilty” to 19 counts of murder, attempted 
murder, and miscellaneous firearms and explosives charges; faces both 
federal and state charges; will likely face two criminal trials (Gartrell 
2020 ; KPIX 5 2020). 
Case Application 
AFH-1, MCO 5354.1E, 
and DODI 1325.06 
 
AFH-1 does not acknowledge anti-government, militia, and patriot 
movement RWE, and therefore does not provide any support for the 
USAF to preemptively identify a case like Carrillo’s radicalization to the 
Boogaloo Movement before full commitment to an act of violence. If 
Carrillo displayed any indicators or warning signs before his killing spree, 
his superiors would not have sufficient military regulations available to 
address his behavior or place emphasis on the threat of anti-government, 
militia, and patriot movement RWE within his unit.  
 
Likewise, MCO 5354.1E incorporates the same ambiguity as AFH-1 
when addressing RWE, leaving a loophole for anti-government, militia, 





DODI 1325.06, as the higher echelon advisory regulation, also does not 
cover anti-government, militia, and patriot movement RWE. While the 
instruction provides commanders with guidelines that include 
administrative counseling, education, and unit training to identify and 
discourage extremist behaviors in a unit, the lack of inclusion of all forms 
of RWE means cases similar to Carrillo’s will continue to be unaddressed.       
AR 600-20 
 
If the USAF utilized the newly revised AR 600-20 regulation, with its full 
inclusion of all forms of RWE as well as its more robust directed 
guidance to commanders for identifying and handling RWE cases in their 
unit ranks, Carrillo’s case would in theory have been effectively 
addressed if his unit acted on any indicators and warnings he displayed.  
  
Navy Regulations and 
Instructions 
 
OPNAV Instructions such as 1620.1B and 3120.32D CH-1 have the same 
policy weaknesses as AFH-1 and DODI 1325.06, leaving a case such as 
Carrillo’s unaddressable; but, when combined with the strengthened 
language from Article 1167, 1990 Navy Regulations, it would be possible 
for the USAF to identify Carrillo’s anti-government radicalization and 
take action.  
 
However, while Article 1167 does provide stronger language covering 
anti-government, militia, and patriot movement RWE, it was added to the 
Navy Regulations in 1997 and subsequent updates to OPNAVINSTR 
1620.1B and 3120.32D CH-1 do not include the expanded definition of 
extremism Article 1167 provides. Therefore, while still in effect, the 2017 
update to 3120.32D CH-1 and the 1999 version of 1620.1B supersede 
Article 1167 in currency and likely application to RWE infractions, 




Table 4. United States Case No. 2: Lance Corporal Vasillios Pistolis 
 
Military Service Type Active Duty, U.S. Marine Corps 
Date of Infraction(s) August 12, 2017 and summer 2017 
Infraction  
Beat a transgendered protestor, Emily Gorcenski, and two other counter-
protestors at the Unite the Right Rally on August 12, 2017 in 
Charlottesville, VA; served as the Atomwaffen Division chapter leader 
for North Carolina for the summer of 2017 before departing AD to join 
another extremist group (Thompson, Winston, and Hanrahan 2018). 
RWE Group Association Atomwaffen Division 
RWE Ideology Supremacist 
Current Status 
Court-martialed for disobeying orders and making false statements in 




docked pay; August 1, 2018, separated from service (Thompson and 
Winston 2018).  
Case Application 
DODI 1325.06, AFH-1, 
AR 600-20, Navy 
Regulations and 
Instructions, and MCO 
5354.1E 
 
All U.S. military regulations sufficiently address the supremacist RWE 
Pistolis adhered to and effectively restricted his involvement in the 
Atomwaffen Division. In Pistolis’ case, the USMC had strong enough 
policies available to identify and confront his RWE behavior (which 
significantly predated his participation in the Unite the Right Rally in 
2017). However, the USMC displayed an organizational unwillingness to 
implement regulations restricting and punishing extremist behavior. This 
reluctance is evident in the court martial charges the USMC brought 
against Pistolis. The lack of charges related to Pistolis’ extremist behavior 
is contrary to the evidence the USMC had available. ProPublica had 
photographic documentation of Pistolis beating a protestor at the Unite 
the Right rally which it published in its coverage of the event; further, the 
USMC could access Pistolis’ own social media posts admitting to the act. 
Both pieces of evidence provided proof of his involvement in a prohibited 
extremist activity – attending a supremacist rally, as well as an act of 
violent assault. Despite discharging Pistolis, the USMC’s reluctance to 




Table 5. United Kingdom Process Model Summary Testing Results 









Weak Weak Moderate 
Proscribed Terrorist 
Organisations,  
Home Office  
(Government Policy) 







United Kingdom: Case Applications 
Table 6. United Kingdom Case No. 1: Lance Corporal Mikko Vehvilainen 
 
Military Service Type Active Duty, British Army 
Date of Infraction(s) September 2017 (date of police raid on personal dwelling) 
Infraction  
Served as a recruiter for National Action inside British Army; harbored a 
large cache of RWE propaganda, memorabilia, and stockpiled weapons in 
his home; participated for several years in online engagement and social 
media espousing supremacist, anti-Semitic, homophobic, and nativist 
beliefs; built a crude electromagnetic pulse device to use in a “race war” 
his terror group was planning on instigating after they converted low-
population rural communities in the British countryside to a “national 
socialist community” base of operations (Dearden 2018; Dearden 2018). 
RWE Group Association National Action 
RWE Ideology Supremacist 
Current Status 
April 2018: sentenced to eight years in prison for violating the Home 
Office’s proscription of National Action as a terrorist organization 
(Siddique 2018). 
Case Application 
Queen’s Regulations & 
Orders, Prevent Strategy 




Given that the Queen’s Regulations & Orders, Prevent Strategy, and 
Proscribed Terrorist Organisations regulations all specifically identify 
National Action as a proscribed organization, they address Vehvilainen’s 
case sufficiently at face value. However, because of the way all three 
define RWE as a blanket term and rely on the Home Office’s formal 
designation of a specific group to enable their leverage against an RWE 
infraction, they are all insufficient to address British military RWE 
incidents associated with groups outside the scope of proscribed 
organizations. Because of this pro-forma legal obstacle to their use, the 
British military is unable to take more proactive measures against RWE in 
its ranks other than to refer service members to radicalization intervention 
programs managed inside the Home Office’s Prevent and Channel 
programs. This gap in policy scope increases the likelihood units will not 
address RWE infractions due to a lack of administrative policy tools, 
other than general administrative punishments for order and discipline, 









Table 7. United Kingdom Case No. 2: Private Mark Barrett 
 
Military Service Type Active Duty, British Army 
Date of Infraction(s) September 2017 (date of detention on his Army base in Cyprus) 
Infraction  
Lance Corporal Vehvilainen recruited Barrett to join National Action 
(they were members of the same unit, the Royal Anglian Regiment); 
charged with a single count of membership in a proscribed organization 
contrary to the Terrorism Act 2000; had National Action and neo-Nazi 
paraphernalia in his possession when detained in Cyprus (Dearden 2017; 
Dearden 2018). 
RWE Group Association National Action 
RWE Ideology Supremacist 
Current Status 
April 13, 2018: Acquitted by the Birmingham Crown Court of 
membership in National Action; separated from service following the trial 
(Vernalls 2018).   
Case Application 
Queen’s Regulations & 
Orders, Prevent Strategy 




While Barrett’s case is similar to Vehvilainen’s in almost every way, in 
that the British military was more enabled to act along with British law 
enforcement authorities because his alleged involvement in RWE was tied 
to a clearly proscribed organization, his case differs in that he was not 
found guilty of membership. However, he was still separated from the 
military based on his association with criminal proceedings, which 
indicates the British military can resolve potential RWE infractions with 
alternative solutions if the formal regulations on extremism association do 
not support leverage of consequences. Even so, Barrett’s case did require 
criminal charges being preferred before the British military acted to 
separate. This sets a high standard and reinforces a gap for lower-level 
policy tools to address RWE infractions below the threshold of criminal 
activity. Further, to better address a culture of RWE or endemic racism in 
the ranks, the policy tools need to explicitly be designed for extremism; 











Table 8. Canada Process Model Summary Testing Results 
 Test #1: RWE Litmus  Test #2: Pathway to Act Test #3: Usage  
Queen’s Regulations 
and Orders for the 
Canadian Armed 
Forces (CAF), Vol. II 
 (Military 
Regulation) 
Moderate Moderate Moderate 
CAO 11-82  
(Military Regulation) 
Moderate Strong Not measurable 
CF Mils Pers Instr 
01/20  
(Military Regulation) 
Moderate Strong Not measurable 
DAOD 5019-0 
(Military Regulation) 
Moderate Strong Not measurable 
 
Canada: Case Applications 
Table 9. Canada Case No. 1: Leading Seaman Boris Mihajlovic 
 
Military Service Type Active Reservist, Royal Canadian Navy (Reserve)  
Date of Infraction(s) 
Multiple years; joined Blood and Honour in 2012, site administrator for 
Iron March website as early as 2016 
Infraction  
Identified as a site administrator for the now defunct “Iron March” 
website in a 2019 hack; also, one of the most prolific contributors to the 
online forum; pro-fascist content, advocated for a “race war,” voiced 
support for the destruction of the Canadian military, and offered to sell 
other members AK-47s, rocket propelled grenades, and other military-
grade weapons; the hack also revealed ties with Combat 18, the armed 
branch of Blood and Honour (Rocha and Yates 2019; Friends of Simon 
Wiesenthal Center for Holocaust Studies 2020).  
RWE Group Association 
Unaffiliated online supremacism (Iron March website) 
Blood and Honour / Combat 18  
RWE Ideology Supremacist 
Current Status 
June 12, 2020: Reinstated to active service after the Royal Canadian Navy 
completed an initial investigation; July 24, 2020: Friends of Simon 
Wiesenthal Center filed an inquiry with the Canadian National Defence 
Department objecting to the return to service decision; August 6, 2020: 
Reinstatement decision is the subject of a Royal Canadian Navy 
command-level review (Rocha and Yates 2020 ; Friends of Simon 





Queen’s Regulations & 
Orders for CAF, Vol. II 
 
As the Queen’s Regulations & Orders only recognizes stronger 
sentencing for service member’s convicted of hate crimes, the regulation 
only provides a mechanism for Mihajlovic’s unit to act on his supremacist 
activity if it had involved an act of violence. As the QR&O is the only 
regulation that predates Mihajlovic’s RWE infractions, it did not serve as 
a strong enough policy in his case. This is evident in the fact that 
Mihajlovic allegedly admitted his involvement with Blood and Honour 
and Combat 18 to a unit superior shortly after his enlistment in 2016; 
however, he was only advised to break ties with the group (Rocha and 
Yates 2019). The CAF’s more specific extremism policies, CAO 11-82, 
CF Mils Pers Instr 01/20, and the update to DAOD 5019-0 were not yet in 
effect, which leaves the possibility the superior did not have the policy 
tools necessary to handle Mihajlovic’s admission to RWE involvement. 
However, it could equally be the case the unit superior was demonstrating 
a lack of willingness to address the RWE incident with stronger 
enforcement, but the lack of strict policy within the QR&O at the time 
obfuscates this potential.  
 
CAO 11-82, CF Mils 
Pers Instr 01/20, DAOD 
5019-0 
 
With the July 2020 update to the CAF’s “Hateful Conduct Policy,” CAO 
11-82, CF Mils Pers Instr 01/20, and DAOD 5019-0 contain language 
strong enough to address a clear case of supremacist RWE behavior such 
as Mihajlovic’s. This policy strength includes the additional entrance 
screening requirements the CAF is implementing for new recruits 
alongside the application of its new hateful conduct policies to current 
service members. These changes, in theory, would be sufficient to 
identify the type of preexistent supremacist behavior Mihajlovic 
participated in prior to enlisting, as his case documents RWE association 
starting in his early teen years (Rocha and Yates 2019). While the 
Canadian military was screening for flagged behavior when Mihajlovic 
entered the service, the language added to the CAF’s policies on 
extremism in 2020 provide clearer guidance for background investigators 
to identify preexisting RWE behaviors and bar access to military service 
for cases like Mihajlovic. 
 
Separately, the CAF is undergoing a change in organizational willingness 
to address cases of RWE. These changes are evident in the way the CAF 
has handled Mihajlovic’s reinstatement case, bringing it back for review 
in August 2020 after internal and external advocates demanded 
investigation into his return to active service. That the Royal Canadian 
Navy chose to reinstate him in July 2020, despite a clear, broader 
command climate of intent to deal more strongly with RWE incidents and 
behavior, speaks to an organizational culture of leniency for RWE. The 
decision to reinstate him is shocking given the sentiment Mihajlovic 
expressed on Iron March, advocating for the destruction of the Canadian 
military as well as his apparent attempts to sell military-grade weapons to 
other extremists on the site. However, the Ministry of Defence’s 




command-level review indicates organizational change may be occurring 
alongside the greater emphasis on hateful conduct within the entire CAF. 
 
 
Table 10. Canada Case No. 2: Master Corporal Corey Hurren 
 
Military Service Type Reservist, Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Rangers 
Date of Infraction(s) July 2, 2020 
Infraction  
Attempted to militantly confront Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau 
by crashing his vehicle through the pedestrian entrance at the viceregal 
state residence of Canada, Rideau Hall (where PM Trudeau resides), in 
Ottawa, Canada; was heavily armed and carrying a two-page letter 
outlining right-wing beliefs and conspiracy-theory driven accusations 
against the Trudeau administration and the PM’s handling of the COVID-
19 pandemic when apprehended on the residential grounds (Boutilier and 
Quan 2020; Brewster and Ling 2020; Tunney and Ling 2020).  
RWE Group Association QAnon  
RWE Ideology Anti-Government, Militia, Patriot Movement  
Current Status 
Incarcerated and awaiting trial for 22 charges involving firearms 
violations, being armed with a weapon in a restricted area, and issuing a 
threat of bodily harm or danger to the prime minister; next hearing is 
scheduled for November 6, 2020; has been discharged from the CAF 
(Tunney 2020; Global News 2020; CP24 News 2020; North Shore News 
2020).  
Case Application 
Queen’s Regulations & 
Orders for CAF, Vol. II 
 
As the Queen’s Regulations and Orders do not address anti-government, 
militia, and patriot movement RWE, the orders provide no basis to handle 
a case of extremism such as Hurren’s. While Hurren’s reservist status 
could be viewed as a complication to the ability to leverage military 
regulations against right-wing behavior displayed during periods of 
civilian status, it is possible to combine sections of the National Defence 
Act of 1985 to the CAF Code of Service regulations to establish military 
jurisdiction (Brewster 2020). However, this extended process is 
complicated and presents a significant legal burden to military units 
attempting to regulate anti-government sentiment within their ranks that 
would not be the case if the QR&O more explicitly addressed the full 
scope of RWE.  
 
CAO 11-82, CF Mils 
Pers Instr 01/20, DAOD 
5019-0 
 
Even with the expansion of the CAF’s hateful conduct policies, the 
exclusion of anti-government, militia, and patriot movement RWE in the 
new policies precludes military units from taking proactive measures 
against cases such as Hurren’s. While the policies give more robust 




if need be, referral to criminal proceedings, this only applies to RWE 
infractions involving supremacism, nativism, or fundamentalism. This 
oversight in the policy update presents a loophole for anti-government 
RWE sentiment to only be addressed after an act of violence has occurred 
or been attempted, such as Hurren’s case, because the Canadian 
government can then prefer charges against the offender based on 
criminal code. However, this threshold of a violent act is an ineffective 




Table 11. Germany Process Model Summary Testing Results 





Symbols, and Banned 
Organisations 
(Government Policy) 
Weak Moderate Moderate 
German Criminal 
Code, 1998 
Not applicable Not applicable Moderate 
 
Germany: Case Applications 
Table 12. Germany Case No. 1: First Lieutenant Franco “Franco A.” Albrecht 
 
Military Service Type Active Duty, Bundeswehr (German Army) 
Date of Infraction(s) 
November 2015 (falsely applied for asylum posing as a Syrian refugee); 
February 2017 (arrested and then deliberately released by Austrian 
authorities at Vienna international airport attempting to retrieve a firearm 
and ammunition he cached in an airport bathroom; the release was to 
further an undercover investigation into his follow-on activities); April 
26, 2017 (arrested again following police investigation) (DW News 2017; 
DW News 2018). 
Infraction  
Masqueraded as a Syrian refugee starting in 2015 while still serving on 
active duty; intended to carry out a series of high-profile assassinations of 
pro-asylum politicians while posing as a refugee to instigate a backlash 
against refugees and other Muslim immigrants; German authorities and 
defense leadership found Wehrmacht memorabilia and other Nazi 
paraphernalia while searching his barracks after his arrest; investigators 




a master’s thesis with supremacist content while studying as a student at a 
French military academy in 2014 (DW News 2017; DW News 2018). 
RWE Group Association No formal group affiliation 
RWE Ideology Supremacist / Nativist 
Current Status 
December 2017: the German Federal Court of Justice dismissed the initial 
criminal case, citing insufficient evidence to prove intent to commit a 
terrorist attack; German prosecutors brought a second indictment, 
including charges of planning an act of violence (based on a “hit list” 
discovered during the investigation into communications with two  
collaborators), and miscellaneous firearms and explosives violations; 
discharged from service in 2017 while incarcerated and awaiting final 
charges; November 2017: released and placed under house arrest with 
charges pending; June 2019: case is still awaiting trial (DW News 2017; 
DW News 2018 ; Deutsche Presseagentur 2018).  
Case Application 
Right-Wing Extremism: 
Signs, Symbols, and 
Banned Organisations 
and German Criminal 
Code, 1998 
 
As a government policy outlining prohibited expressions of RWE and 
association with designated unconstitutional organizations, the Bundesamt 
für Verfassungsschutz’s official publication provides a basis of guidance 
to the German military of how German criminal code prohibits forms of 
RWE involving supremacism such as Albrecht’s.  
 
However, Albrecht’s case is significantly complex because it involves his 
duplicitous enrollment into an asylum program over a hundred kilometers 
away from his designated duty station, his collaboration to assassinate 
government officials, the display of prohibited memorabilia in his 
assigned barracks room, and his history of RWE sentiment documented in 
his first master’s thesis draft rejected for supremacist content. The number 
of breakdowns in the system for Albrecht’s case to transpire is quite 
extreme. If his barracks was subjected to inspection, which is a customary 
practice in Western militaries, the  Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz’s 
government policy provides sufficient guidance to his unit that the 
memorabilia in his barracks room was in violation of section 86a of the 
German Criminal Code, which would initiate an investigation. However, 
more egregiously, the mishandling of his master’s thesis topic where the 
German military did not act on the displayed RWE sentiment but instead 
administratively counseled Albrecht to change the thesis displays an 
organizational unwillingness to address RWE in the ranks and indicates 
the German military requires stronger policy emphasis.  
 
While the German military is presently undergoing an internal RWE 
review and initiating hundreds of investigations through its 
counterintelligence unit now that cases such as Albrecht’s have come to 
light, there are still gaps in policy for handling RWE infractions that fall 
below the threshold of criminal activity. Ultimately, Germany’s military 
justice system, with its administrative disciplinary actions carried out by 
troop service courts and all other actions against German soldiers carried 




robust enough lower-level mechanisms to handle RWE infractions to 
identify cases of supremacism like Albrecht’s before they escalate to 
preparation for acts of violence.   
 
 
Table 13. Germany Case No. 2: “Little Sheep” (Unidentified Kommando Spezialkräfte 
(KSK) Sergeant Major) 
 
Military Service Type Active Duty, Bundeswehr 
Date of Infraction(s) 
Multiple years (under investigation since 2017); May 2020 (police raid on 
dwelling) 
Infraction  
Stole munitions and explosives (PETN charges, a detonator and fuse, 
thousands of rounds of ammunition) from his unit, the KSK; stockpiled 
other weapons (AK-47, a silencer, knives and a crossbow), and buried 
them in his garden; had banned Nazi memorabilia, including an SS 
songbook, in his home; reported in 2017 for harboring RWE sentiments 
following an informal gathering at a shooting range where KSK members, 
including “Little Sheep,” demonstrated Nazi gestures and performed neo-
Nazi songs (Woodyatt 2020; Bennhold 2020; BBC News 2020).  
RWE Group Association No formal group affiliation 
RWE Ideology Supremacist  
Current Status 
Arrested and under criminal investigation, case and trial pending formal 
prosecutorial charges; July 1, 2020: after determining rampant right-wing 
association throughout the entire unit, the German Defense Minister 
disbanded the KSK (Sahinkaya 2020; Bennhold 2020).  
Case Application 
Right-Wing Extremism: 
Signs, Symbols, and 
Banned Organisations 
and German Criminal 
Code, 1998 
 
“Little Sheep’s” case is as complex as Albrecht’s in terms of the series of 
breakdowns in military procedures which unfolded to allow for his illegal 
theft of so much military-grade explosives, stockpiling of weapons, and 
overt ascription to RWE, however what is most concerning about his case 
is how rife his military unit was found to be with overt supremacist 
activities. “Little Sheep’s” case points to a dilemma of what can be done 
when a problem assails an entire institution. While the German Ministry 
of Defence dealt with the dilemma by dissolving the entire unit, it does 
present a question of how to rectify such sweeping levels of 
organizational unwillingness to address RWE in the ranks for the future, 
as eliminating units is an unsustainable solution.  
 
While German criminal code and the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz’s 
government policy at face value are more than sufficiently strong to 
address “Little Sheep’s” case, there are still gaps in policy to enable 
lower-level tools to effectively address RWE infractions in the ranks, as 
well as some form of system of accountability to prevent an entire unit 





Discussion and Analysis 
 Overall, no study country demonstrated a policy measuring “strong” in every process 
model step, although the United States’ updated AR 600-20 regulation has the most potential 
to be the strongest anti-extremism policy in use. This is because AR 600-20 effectively 
addressed all forms of RWE and provided clear guidance and expected standards for 
implementation. However, given how new the policy is, and the United States’ history of 
failures to address RWE in the ranks despite regulatory guidance, the overall strength of AR 
600-20 is dependent on the organizational willingness of the U.S. Army to use the policy to 
its fullest extent. Meanwhile, the remainder of the United States’ regulations, along with the 
other study countries, fell short of achieving effective policy strength ratings because they 
failed to address the full scope of RWE threatening Western militaries, and historically lack 
enforcement of regulations against RWE in the ranks. While Canada’s updated policies 
contain an emphasis on removing RWE within the ranks, setting them apart from the rest of 
the cases, the policies are new, and time is necessary to determine if they will be 
implemented with regularity.  
Conversely, the United Kingdom faces a two-fold problem with the strength of its 
policies. First, the British military is reliant on broader government policies for anti-
extremism regulations to manage RWE within its ranks. This dependency on the proscription 
system, codified in British criminal code and exercised through the powers of the Home 
Office, leaves the possibility the British military will be unable to act against RWE 
infractions that do not involve a formally proscribed organization. Second, the key 
government policy this system is dependent on, the 2011 Prevent Strategy, lacks any formal 




failing to define RWE, and instead treating the term as a generalized, all-encompassing 
reference, the policy is inherently limited in its ability to address emergent RWE threats or 
those falling outside the perception of policy makers’ cognizance of RWE while the 
extensive bias in the policy further weakens its foundations and overall utility.  
Finally, Germany’s system of designated unconstitutional organizations and history 
of sensitivity to RWE should provide a stronger basis for identifying and eliminating RWE in 
the ranks of its military. However, Germany’s policies addressed RWE with a single focus on 
those forms that share ideological beliefs with National Socialism, making Germany’s efforts 
to curb RWE limited with such a biased concentration on a specific strain of RWE. This 
failure to acknowledge other forms leaves Germany unprepared to deal with the increasing 
internationalization of RWE. Likewise, despite the policies in place to address this form of 
RWE, Germany’s military failed to act over many years and is now faced with an institution-
wide review and purge due to long-term lack of enforcement. While Germany’s policies 
failed the overall strength test, the policies it has in place were more than sufficient to handle 
the specific RWE involved in both its cases, which reinforces Germany’s real issue is a crisis 
of organizational willingness to act. The Bundeswehr’s failure to address the known activity 
within the KSK and “Little Sheep’s” case has affected the integrity of an entire institution 
and created a rift in the German public’s trust. Indeed, the dissolution of an entire unit due to 
penetration of RWE ideology reduces a critical capability in the German military’s readiness 
and represents the harsh reality of what unchecked RWE behavior can do to the military’s 
ranks.     
 Meanwhile, while this study sought to reduce the possibility of bias and rigor issues 




model testing for each country, it is possible the study did not include all relevant policy 
documents for the United Kingdom and Germany. Every attempt was made to thoroughly 
identify relevant military regulations for each study country; however, the United Kingdom 
and Germany do not make their military regulations easily searchable for the public. In the 
case of the United Kingdom, the Queen’s Regulations and Orders were identifiable, but 
beyond that, no further military regulations or documents were locatable. However, extensive 
research into how the United Kingdom dealt with extremism confirmed the British military is 
covered by the Home Office’s Prevent program, but it is unknown if there are more pertinent 
internal military regulations dealing with command guidance on extremism. Meanwhile, 
Germany’s system of civilian justice oversight of the military, institutionalized in the 1950s, 
made the use of criminal code as a primary policy document for addressing extremism in the 
military appropriate for the study. However, if there are further military regulations providing 
more detailed command guidance on handling extremism in the ranks, they were 
unidentifiable despite extensive research. It is possible regulations are available to the public 
but were unidentifiable due to a moderate German language barrier; however, German 
government websites provided a built-in option to translate all content to English and 
extensive research into all locatable, relevant official German websites did not locate any 
pertinent military regulations.  
 Likewise, this study identified the most robust RWE infraction cases available to the 
public. However, the United Kingdom does not release the details of active or current RWE 
infractions in its military. Therefore, the only two RWE cases available for the study 
involved two individuals from the same overall incident, with the details only being available 




second, separate RWE infraction for the case application in part II, but no such case was 
identifiable. Therefore, the study’s rigor was slightly reduced by the use of two RWE cases 
stemming from the same incident.  
 Lastly, while the study does not have any cognizant instances of bias, the researcher 
is an active duty U.S. Army officer. As such, the researcher has professional experience with 
the policies involved in the United States section, which led to a more nuanced ability to 
assess the content analysis of each document and to apply the process model to the policies 
and selected RWE cases for part II of the study. However, the researcher did not anticipate 
the U.S. Army’s updated command policy would rate the strongest of the study; the fact that 
AR 600-20 came out of the process model with such a rating does not reflect any personal 
bias on the researcher’s part to support a U.S. Army policy. In fact, the researcher expected 
the policy to rate much weaker in the process model and as compared against other study 
countries’ policies.  
Conclusion 
 Ultimately, this study found Western democracies generally fail to address all forms 
of RWE threatening their societies, leaving them vulnerable to the growth of different strains 
of RWE which are increasingly more rampant and internationally connected between 
Western countries than ever before (Perliger 2020). While a select few Western military 
regulations addressed all forms of RWE, this was not the case across the whole of a study 
country’s policies which indicates a lack of uniform perception of the overall threat. The 
strongest anti-extremism policies must address all four key strains of RWE if they are to be 
capable of confronting the changing, evolving nature of existing RWE, and those that are 




extremism policies displayed across the study speaks to foundational cultural issues with 
acknowledging the threat RWE presents to Western militaries and reinforces the aggregate 
strength of a policy lies not only in how well it deals with the issue at hand, but in the 
policy’s enactment. While the countries involved in this study need to rectify the general 
omission of anti-government, militia, and patriot movement RWE in their policies, as well as 
more concretely address fundamentalist RWE, they more urgently need to resolve their 
general denial that RWE is a threat inside their military institutions. Across the board, the 
countries involved in this study publicly insist that the existence of RWE in their military’s 
ranks is low, almost nonexistent, but the problem is profoundly understudied and there are no 
reliable statistics for how penetrated each study country is with regard to RWE.  
Further, a key aspect of this study is the premise it treats the utility of strict, exact 
wording in policies as a factor of how effective they will be. This study assumes strict 
wording is better because of the inherent clarity it provides. However, another study can 
examine if a more general approach is better.   
Likewise, additional studies are necessary to truly determine the actual scope of the 
problem before any Western democracy can claim RWE is a low-level phenomenon in their 
military. The pace of RWE acts of violence, swelling number and size of RWE groups in 
each country, and the push of populist sentiment across Western society writ large speaks to 
a much more endemic and concerning problem. In other words, the size of the threat is 
unknown, but the indicators that RWE is more ingrained in Western militaries than policy 






Appendix A: Study Country Policy Document Tables 
The following tables provide the policy documents this study examined for each 
study country and identifies the specific sub-documents or sections this study analyzed for 
the content analysis portion of part I of the study. 
For the United States, this study analyzed the following seven policy documents:  
Table 14. United States Policy Documents  
Primary Document Sub-Document or Section Type 
   




Army Regulation (AR) 600-20,  - Paragraph 4-12 Military 
Regulation 
Marine Corps Order (MCO) 
5354.1E 
- Section 0107 Military 
Regulation 




- Section 3.5.8 Military 
Regulation 
OPNAVINST 3120.32D CH-1, 
Standard Organization and 
Regulations of the U.S. Navy 
 
- Section 5.1.41(c) Military 
Regulation 
United States Navy Regulations, 
1990 
- Article 1167 Military 
Regulation 
Air Force Handbook (AFH) 1 - Section 6.39.4 










For the United Kingdom, this study analyzed the following three policy documents:  
Table 15. United Kingdom Policy Documents  
Primary Document Sub-Document or Section Type 
   
Queen’s Regulation’s for the 
Army 
- Chapter 5, Part 2, Section 5.085(c) 




Prevent Strategy (June 2011) - Revised Prevent Duty Guidance for Scotland 
(April 2019) 
- Revised Prevent Duty Guidance for Wales 
and England (April 2019) 








For Canada, this study analyzed the following six policy documents:  
Table 16. Canada Policy Documents 
Primary Document Sub-Document or Section Type 
   
Queen’s Regulations and Orders 
for the Canadian Armed Forces, 
Vol. II 




Canadian Army Order (CAO) 11-
82, Hateful Conduct 
 Military 
Regulation 
Canadian Forces Military 
Personnel Instruction (CF Mil 




Defence Administrative Orders 
and Directives (DAOD) 5019-0, 











For Germany, this study analyzed the following two policy documents:  
Table 17. Germany Policy Documents 
Primary Document Sub-Document or Section Type 
   
Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 
Right-Wing Extremism: Signs, 




   
German Criminal Code, 1998 - Section 46(2), Principles of Sentencing 
- Section 81, High Treason Against the 
Federation 
- Section 83, Preparation of an Enterprise 
Directed at High Treason 
- Section 84, Continuation of a Political Party 
Declared Unconstitutional 
- Section 86, Dissemination of Propaganda 
Material of Unconstitutional Organisations 
- Section 86a, Using Symbols of 
Unconstitutional Organisations 
- Section 129a, Forming Terrorist 
Organisations 















Appendix B: Expanded Content Analysis Findings and Analysis 
United States Content Analysis Findings 
Primary Findings: Military Regulations 
 For the United States military regulations, all documents incorporated the base 
definition for RWE activities and association from DODI 1325.06, “Handling Dissident and 
Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces,” which defined RWE as, 
Military personnel must not actively advocate supremacist, extremist, or criminal 
gang doctrine, ideology, or causes, including those that advance, encourage, or 
advocate illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion, ethnicity, or 
national origin or those that advance, encourage, or advocate the use of force, 
violence, or criminal activity or otherwise advance efforts to deprive individuals of 
their civil rights. (9) 
 
As a result, every military regulation, except for two, failed to account for all forms of RWE 
because this definition excludes anti-government, militia, and patriot movement RWE. The 
two regulations that do account for all RWE strains are Article 1167, “Supremacist 
Activities,” Chapter 11, United States Navy Regulations, 1990, which states,  
No person in the naval service shall participate in any organization that espouses 
supremacists causes; attempts to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, 
color, sex, religion, or national origin; advocates the use of force or violence against 
the government of the United States or the government of any state, territory, district, 
or possession thereof, of the government of any subdivision therein; or otherwise 
engages in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights. (19) (emphasis added) 
 
The second regulation, AR 600-20, accounts for anti-government, militia, and patriot group 
association by adding, “Expressing a duty to engage in violence against DoD or the United 




 Meanwhile, in defining forms of RWE activities and association, all military 
regulations contained language fully identifying all possible types of association or activities, 
including physical participation (attending rallies, being active members in a group or 
organization, holding leadership roles in associations), speech and dialogue (advocacy and 
hate speech), and accounted for the role of social media and online activities as a form of 
participation and venue for hate speech and extremist dialogue.  
Secondary Findings: Military Regulations 
 This study did not identify any instances of implicit bias in United States military 
regulations indicative of a latent prejudice towards other forms of extremism as more 
threatening or serious than RWE. However, a number of military regulations displayed 
instances of optional language, using phrases such as “should” or “may choose” in sections 
of the documents dedicated to providing guidance to those responsible for implementing the 
policy or regulation in the event of an infraction. This window of optionality in the language 
phrasing may lessen the likelihood of action by not adopting a more stringent requirement to 
act in the faith of the policy or regulation. 
United Kingdom Content Analysis Findings 
Primary Key Findings: Military Regulations 
 For the United Kingdom military regulations, the Queen’s Regulations for the Army, 
1972, does not define or address extremism in any specific terms and instead lists prohibited 
forms of behavior or engagement with extremist groups the United Kingdom Home Office 





Secondary Findings: Military Regulations   
 This study did not identify any cases of implicit bias in relevant policy language in 
the Queen’s Regulations. However, the guidance dedicated to reinforcing that armed forces 
members are subject to the restrictions of the Home Office’s proscription of organizations, 
section 5.085(c), begins with phrasing that is relatively weak in emphasis on the seriousness 
of association with or active involvement in extremism, as it simply states that doing so is 
“inconsistent with the responsibilities of military service for personnel.” Thus, the section 
does not seem to treat extremist activity or association of any nature as serious or grave and 
introduces enforcement optionality with the wording choice of extremist association only 
being “inconsistent” with military service.  
Primary Findings: Government Policies 
For the United Kingdom government policies, all documents referred to RWE as a 
threat to the United Kingdom’s security but did not formally provide a definition for what 
constitutes RWE. Only one document, the 2011 Prevent Strategy, included any specific 
reference to a type of RWE, stating in section 5.36 that “extreme right-wing groups” have a 
“white supremacist ideology.” However, the entire document provides only a single 
reference and does not expand upon what the British government considers “white 
supremacism” to be; furthermore, this limited and vague reference means that the United 
Kingdom fails to recognize any other form of RWE. Further, at no point does any document 
attempt to define the types of victims or targets RWE adherents might attack or commit 






Secondary Findings: Government Policies  
In terms of secondary content, the United Kingdom government policies contained 
the highest level of biased language of any other country in the case study. Of the five 
documents that fell within the category of government policies and regulations, all five 
contained implicit bias phrases that either attempted to downgrade the threat of RWE in 
comparison to Islamist extremism or directly stated Islamist extremism embodied the greater 
threat to the United Kingdom and therefore was a higher priority. However, four of the five 
documents are derivatives of the base document, the 2011 Prevent Strategy, so their use of 
implicit bias phrasing is because they borrow exact language from Prevent without any 
modifications.  
 In the Prevent Strategy, the most flagrant biased phrases included the following from 
section 7.1, “Prevent should address all forms of terrorism, but continue to prioritise 
according to the risks to our national security. Its principle focus will therefore remain 
terrorism associated with Al Qa’ida and related groups” (2011, 44). This phrase, and variants 
like it, is repeated in Prevent approximately eighteen times throughout the policy. Even more 
telling, every time Prevent acknowledges RWE as a threat, it immediately follows with a 
negating statement arguing that Al Qa’ida is a greater threat overall. Of the four times 
Prevent directly recognizes that RWE represents a threat to the United Kingdom, the 
document counters the admission within one or two sentences in proximity, attempting to 
redirect the priority back on to Islamist extremism. This bias is even more notable when 
examining the radicalization and recruitment sections; according to Prevent, Islamist 
extremism radicalizes and recruits, while RWE “draws people in.” This framing attempts to 




when considered alongside section 5.42, which claims the United Kingdom has an overall 
absence of RWE organizations and formal groups.  
Canada Content Analysis Findings 
Primary Findings: Military Regulations 
For Canada’s military regulations, all documents used the base definition for “hateful 
conduct” in DAOD 5019-0, “Conduct and Performance Deficiencies,” which defined RWE 
activities and targets as,  
An act or conduct, including the display or communication of words, symbols or 
images, by a CAF member, that they knew or ought reasonably to have known would 
constitute, encourage, justify or promote violence or hatred against a person or 
persons of an identifiable group, based on their national or ethnic origin, race, colour, 
religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, marital status, 
family status, genetic characteristics or disability. (2020) 
 
This definition, while thorough in how it identifies the variety of ways RWE can manifest as 
well as the types of targets it can be aimed at, covers supremacist, nativist, and 
fundamentalist RWE, but fails to address anti-government, militia, and patriot movement-
driven RWE. Additionally, section 203.3(a)(ii) of Article 104.14 in Volume II, Discipline, 
Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces, references supremacist, nativist, 
and fundamentalist RWE types of targets when it provides harsher sentencing guidelines for 
armed forces members convicted of hate crime violations (13).     
 Meanwhile, the Canadian Forces Military Personnel Instruction (CF Mil Pers Instr) 
01/20 “Hateful Conduct,” which the Canadian service branches base their expanded guidance 
for extremism association off,  also thoroughly defines all possible forms of RWE association 
or types of RWE activity, including physical participation, speech and dialogue, and extends 




Secondary Findings: Military Regulations  
This study did not identify any of implicit bias in Canada’s military regulations, nor 
were there any observed incidents of optional language that could undermine the reasonable 
application of the policy or regulation to RWE infractions.  
Germany Content Analysis Findings 
Primary Findings: Government Policies 
German government policy is unique regarding the banning and restriction of 
organizations, particularly those with neo-Nazi supremacist beliefs, due to the country’s 
relationship with its National Socialist past. This is evident in the Bundesamt für 
Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) published policy 
Right-Wing Extremism: Signs, Symbols, and Banned Organizations, which contains statutory 
guidance drawn from German criminal code to advise on how the German state restricts 
expressions of RWE, and provides a list of right-wing organizations Germany considers 
“unconstitutional.” However, despite significant discussion about the threat of RWE, slanted 
heavily towards supremacist forms, the regulation does not utilize a base definition of RWE. 
The publication instead relies on a form of RWE expression (signs, symbols, dialogue that 
specifically references National Socialist-associated beliefs) to define RWE. In addition, the 
policy document does not formally define what constitutes a RWE target, but does make a 
small reference in the preface to how right-wing extremists can be emboldened to conduct 
attacks against “socially underprivileged and minority groups” (3). At no point, however, 
does the policy document reference another form of RWE as a threat, or recognize any other 




different banned organizations all of which have supremacist and nativist foundational 
beliefs.     
Secondary Findings: Government Policies 
Section 5, “General Identification of Features of Right-Wing Extremists,” of the 
Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz policy document is an extremely interesting section 
dedicated to the discussion of what right-wing extremists do and do not look like to the 
casual observer. While the document acknowledges right-wing extremists cannot be 
identified solely on physical appearance (but claims this used to be the case to a certain 
degree), the section still attempts to frame sartorial choices as an indicator, particularly with 
discussion focused on how right-wing extremists use clothing choices to convey messages 
overtly and subtly as part of a shared identity (64). This section, while not overtly employing 
implicit bias in the same manner as other policy documents in this case study, does 
incorporate some elements of bias with its assumption of RWE expressions and behaviors.    
Primary Findings: Criminal Code 
German criminal code takes an equally unique approach to how it criminalizes 
various types of behavior related to RWE. As shown with German government policy, the 
state places particular priority on propaganda and the display of banned symbols and signs. 
Section 86 of the German criminal code specifically references, in slightly distancing 
language, that dissemination of propaganda in support of supremacist organizations is 
considered a criminal act, stating, “propaganda materials the contents of which are intended 
to further the aims of a former National Socialist organisation, [emphasis added] shall be 




the only criminal code in the case study to identify a specific strain of RWE as criminal but is 
understandable in the context of the country’s history. However, while the criminal code 
does recognize a form of RWE, it is the only strain the German state identifies explicitly. 
German criminal code does not otherwise restrict other forms of RWE, except through 
generalized application of other statutes dedicated to terrorism, incitement to hatred, and 
treason (which based on the language utilized can be substituted for sedition that could be 
associated with anti-government, militia, and patriot group RWE). Meanwhile, section 46(2), 
“Principles of Sentencing,” provides for harsher sentencing for crimes believed to be 
motivated by supremacist or nativist beliefs.    
Secondary Findings: Criminal Code 
This study did not identify any instances of distinct implicit bias in German criminal 
code, nor optional language. However, as stated previously the German state’s tendency to 
focus solely on National Socialist forms of RWE, which does cover most supremacist and 
some nativist-leaning groups that intermix supremacist language in their beliefs, means that 
other forms of RWE such as pure nativism, fundamentalism, and anti-government, militia, 
and patriot group strains do not receive any consideration as threats. Therefore, Germany’s 








Appendix C: Expanded Process Model Testing Results Findings and Analysis 
United States 
Table 18. United States Process Model Testing 
DODI 1325.06 (Military Regulation) 
Strength Test #1: 
RWE Litmus Test 
 
Strength: Moderate. Identifies supremacism, and additional language can 
cover nativism and fundamentalism. Does not explicitly cover anti-
government, militia, patriot movement RWE, but cites that Title 18, U.S.C. 
§2385 (advocating overthrow of the Government) applies to service 
members. 
   
Strength Test #2: 
Mechanism / 
Pathway to Act 
 
Strength: Weak / Strong. Mostly weak because it primarily establishes a 
normative standard for service branches to follow; directs service branch 
chiefs to establish procedures to implement the instruction’s guidance. 
However, Enclosure 3 of the instruction provides procedural guidelines 
advising that commanders have the authority to apply administrative, 
disciplinary, and criminal actions against military personnel who violate the 
prohibited activities clause in the instruction, making the policy stronger, 
but this allowance is not in the primary body of the document. 
 




Strength: Weak. In February 2020, the House Subcommittee on Military 
Personnel held a hearing regarding the increase in RWE incidents in the 
United States military where it heard congressional testimony from the 
Anti-Defamation League (ADL), the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), 
and other hate and extremism watchdog organizations. Testimony noted the 
DoD lacked a comprehensive handling process and uniform emphasis on 
dealing with RWE in the military ranks. Furthermore, according the same 
testimony, DoD leadership demonstrated a normative response to RWE 
incidents, and served only to abrogate RWE events and claim the behavior 
“had no place” in the military, but failed to take more proactive, concrete 
steps to remove the behavior from the ranks (Beirich 2020).  
 
AFH-1 (Military Regulation) 
Strength Test #1: 
RWE Litmus Test 
 
Strength: Moderate. Identifies supremacism, and additional language can 
cover nativism and fundamentalism. Does not address anti-government, 
militia, patriot movement RWE. 
 
Strength Test #2: 
Mechanism / 
Pathway to Act 
 
Strength: Moderate. Explicitly states Air Force service members found in 










Strength: Moderate. The USAF appeared to struggle to determine how to 
fully address known association with RWE despite language in regulations 
prohibiting active involvement in RWE organizations. An August 2017 Air 
Force Judge Advocate General (JAG) legal opinion on prohibited activities 
declared “mere membership” in extremist groups of any nature was not 
prohibited for service members. This set a baseline standard that designated 
membership in an extremist organization did not constitute a form of active 
participation. However, USAF has displayed a willingness to apply AFH-1 
to more clear cases of RWE, such as a 2019 case where a Master Sergeant 
was demoted and recommended for separation after it became known he 
was a member of Identity Evropa, a white supremacist organization 
(OpJAGAF 2017; Beirich 2020).  
 
MCO 5354.1E (Military Regulation) 
Strength Test #1: 
RWE Litmus Test 
 
Strength: Moderate. Identifies supremacism, and additional language can 
cover nativism and fundamentalism. Does not cover anti-government, 
militia, patriot movement RWE. 
 
Strength Test #2: 
Mechanism / 
Pathway to Act 
 
Strength: Weak to Moderate. Section on prohibited extremism activities 
advises violation of the regulation can result in administrative or 
disciplinary actions under Article 92, UCMJ. However, guidelines directing 
handling procedures of suspected prohibited activities violations states a 
normative standard for resolving issues at the lowest command level and 
advises the process to report falls under Equal Opportunity complaint 
procedures instead of treating extremism incidents as a serious offense of its 
own magnitude.  
 




Strength: Weak to Moderate. It appears the USMC initiates investigations 
when it is alerted of RWE incidents; however, there is a lack of 
transparency in how the service resolves most cases and whether 
investigations result in separation from service or only light punishments 
and return to service status. 
   
AR 600-20 (Military Regulation) 
Strength Test #1: 
RWE Litmus Test 
 
Strength: Strong. Identifies all four strains of RWE and contains amplifying 
characteristics of each type to provide for an expansive array of RWE 
organizations.  
 
Strength Test #2: 
Mechanism / 
Pathway to Act 
 
Strength: Strong. Provides extended guidance for commander’s options and 
required responsibilities for handling RWE incidents, including a robust 




guidance for legal or punitive actions to take, advising service members that 
their activities may be reported to law enforcement authorities. 
 




Strength: Not Measurable. AR 600-20 was updated to be more expansive 
and include stricter guidelines for extremism activities in July 2020; as 
such, the policy cannot be evaluated. Prior to the update, the language was 
much less inclusive and therefore did not support application to RWE 
infractions that fell beyond the scope of primarily supremacist activity. The 
July update increases the ability of the policy language to address all forms 
of RWE, however the policy has not been in effect long enough to 
determine its use against infractions. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army’s history of 
ensuring all RWE infractions are fully investigated and addressed is not 
strong, according to February 2020 congressional testimony by the ADL, 
SPLC, and the Global Project Against Hate and Extremism.  
 
Navy Regulations and OPNAV Instructions (Military Regulations) 
Strength Test #1: 
RWE Litmus Test 
 
OPNAVINST 1620.1B and 3120.32D CH-1: Strength: Moderate. All three 
regulations identify supremacism, and additional language addresses 
nativism and fundamentalism. None of the regulations cover anti-
government, militia, patriot movement RWE.  
 
Article 1167, 1990 Regulations: Strong. Specifically adds language to 
address all four strains of RWE.  
 
Strength Test #2: 
Mechanism / 
Pathway to Act 
 
OPNAVINST 1620.1B and 3120.32D CH-1: Strength: Moderate. 1620.1B 
reissues guidance from DODI 1325.06, providing for administrative 
consequences. 3120.32D CH-1 acknowledges administrative punishments 
available via the U.S. Navy Equal Opportunity program. Neither regulation 
acknowledges potential for legal or punitive actions against RWE 
infractions of criminal magnitude.  
 
Article 1167, 1990 Regulations: Not applicable. Article 1167 is an interim 
change to the Navy’s definition of supremacist activities and does not 
contain language discussing RWE infraction handling procedures.  
 




Strength: Weak. The U.S. Navy has a history of failing to fully address 
RWE infractions even when the service is alerted to activities. A key 
example is former Navy Seal Matt Buschbacher; according to February 
2020 congressional testimony, the SPLC alerted the USN Buschbacher was 
involved with the neo-Nazi National Alliance conference of 2002. Despite 
notification, the USN allowed Buschbacher to continue service and 








Table 19. United Kingdom Process Model Testing 
Queen’s Regulations and Orders (Military Regulation) 
Strength Test #1: 
RWE Litmus Test 
 
Strength: Weak. Does not identify any strains of RWE and only refers to 
extremism as a general term in reference to proscribed organizations. 
 
Strength Test #2: 
Mechanism / 
Pathway to Act 
 
Strength: Weak. Primarily establishes a normative standard that 
membership, involvement, or association with a Home Office-designated 
proscribed organization is inconsistent with military service. Provides for 
commanding officers to issue warnings to personnel in violation of the 
regulation (as a primary means of handling the infraction) and allows for 
administrative discharge only in “aggravated cases.” 
 




Strength: Moderate. The British Army reportedly disseminated an “XRW” 
chart after the arrest of four service members in connection with the 
proscribed right-wing group National Action. The chart was designed to 
help leadership identify potential RWE cases within their ranks but received 
heavy criticism after it was leaked to the public. The Ministry of Defence 
acknowledged the chart and confirmed it was part of the military’s efforts to 
spot, assess, and curb RWE cases (Di Stefano 2019). Furthermore, the 
British military has reportedly referred five additional service members to 
the government’s Prevent program to address potential RWE radicalization 
(Koehler 2019, 10). However, despite these positive examples, the British 
military also has severe endemic racism that indicate less than routine 
handling of RWE infractions. In January 2019, a former British soldier of 
Fijian heritage won a successful racial discrimination suit against the MOD 
and was awarded £490,000 because of the racist command climate he 
experienced (Mark 2020).  
 
Prevent Strategy (2011) (Government Policy) 
Strength Test #1: 
RWE Litmus Test 
 
Strength: Weak. Does not identify any strains of RWE; instead, uses 
“extreme right-wing terrorism” as a blanket term throughout entire policy 
without further defining what constitutes right-wing terrorism.  
 
Strength Test #2: 
Mechanism / 
Pathway to Act 
 
Strength: Weak. Does not address the military as a sector in need of specific 
Prevent resources, instead focusing on specific “at-risk” communities, 
schools, the NHS, the prison system, and overseas application. Relies on 
local law enforcement, as well as a policy of “citizen vigilance,” to identify 
extremism cases of all kinds, including RWE. While the policy outlines a 
system of oversight committees and their handling procedures for cases, its 




cases involving the military or is not transparent about the process if one 
exists.  
 




Strength: Moderate. According to Home Office referral statistics, the 
number of referrals for RWE cases increased two-fold from 2016 – 2018 
after the proscription of National Action, and in 2018-2019 the number of 
referrals was almost at parity with those for Islamist extremism (1,389 
right-wing referrals to 1,404 Islamist referrals) (The Soufan Center 2020).  
 
Proscribed Terrorist Organisations, Home Office (Government Policy) 
Strength Test #1: 
RWE Litmus Test 
 
Strength: Not applicable. Outlines the British legal definition of terrorism 
and proscription criteria which are both suitable, if necessary, to cover 
RWE. Formally proscribes three RWE groups, National Action, its 
derivatives NS131 and Scottish Dawn, Sonnenkrieg Division, and 
Feuerkrieg Division, recognizing their specific strains of supremacism and 
nativism RWE ideologies. Does not designate any fundamentalist or anti-
government, militia, patriot movement groups but this does not reflect lack 
of scope to address either RWE strain.  
 
Strength Test #2: 
Mechanism / 
Pathway to Act 
 
Strength: Strong. Provides clear guidance on what constitutes a proscription 
offence involving a proscribed organization, including forms of support and 
advocacy for a group, assistance, and the wear of clothing, insignia, or 
public displays of flags, logos and other signs expressing images in support 
of a group. Provides for criminal statutory consequences for proscription 
offences. 
 




Strength: Strong. Since designating the first RWE group as a proscribed 
organization in 2016, the United Kingdom has pursued eight criminal trials 
for individuals found to be involved in proscription offences, including two 




Table 20. Canada Process Model Testing 
Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), Vol. II 
  (Military Regulation) 
Strength Test #1: 
RWE Litmus Test 
 
Strength: Moderate. Provides increased sentencing considerations for 
crimes involving supremacist, nativist, and fundamentalist-motivated hate 
offences. Does not contain language formally addressing anti-government, 





Strength Test #2: 
Mechanism / 
Pathway to Act 
 
Strength: Moderate. Provides sentencing guidelines for administrative and 
legal punitive actions against infractions, but only those that clearly meet 
the standard for hate crimes. 
 




Strength: Moderate. While the CAF has demonstrated a renewed emphasis 
on tackling hateful conduct within its ranks, Canadian legal experts have 
noted that the CAF did not pursue criminal proceedings against RWE 
infractions in the past, indicating a potential cultural or organizational 
unwillingness to use regulations to their fullest extent (Burke 2019). 
However, given that the QR&O only pertains to increased sentencing 
guidelines for convicted hate crimes, the regulation on its own is a limited 
tool for addressing RWE in the ranks.  
 
CAO 11-82 (Military Regulation) 
Strength Test #1: 
RWE Litmus Test 
 
Strength: Moderate. Language is broad enough in scope that it can cover 
supremacist, nativist, and fundamentalist forms of RWE. Does not address 
anti-government, militia, patriot movement RWE. Of note, treats RWE as a 
hate crime (as denoted by the regulation title, “Hateful Conduct”) but does 
not consider RWE infractions as potential terrorism.  
 
Strength Test #2: 
Mechanism / 
Pathway to Act 
 
Strength: Strong. Provides extremely clear guidance on administrative and 
disciplinary actions to take, including requirements for reporting 
instructions and incident data information tracking. Provides consideration 
for RWE infractions that meet threshold for criminal proceedings and 
advises on separation and discharge actions to take in response. 
 




Strength: Not measurable. CAO 11-82 was not finalized and issued until the 
Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) expanded DAOD 5019-0 to include 
stronger regulations for hateful conduct. As a result, there is limited scope 
to gauge the Canadian Army’s organizational willingness to implement the 
regulation but there is a strong emphasis and normative standard being 
formed based off the new regulation.  
 
CF Mils Pers Instr 01/20 (Military Regulation) 
Strength Test #1: 
RWE Litmus Test 
 
Strength: Moderate. Language is broad enough in scope that it can cover 
supremacist, nativist, and fundamentalist forms of RWE. Does not address 
anti-government, militia, patriot movement RWE. Of note, treats RWE as a 
hate crime (as denoted by the policy title, “Hateful Conduct”) but does not 
consider RWE infractions as potential terrorism. 
 
Strength Test #2: 
Mechanism / 
Pathway to Act 
 
Strength: Strong. Outlines a three-tiered intervention framework. 




Stipulates required actions for commanding officers to take when dealing 
with a hateful conduct (RWE infraction) event, including administrative 
consequences, disciplinary proceedings, and actions to take complementary 
to legal/punitive proceedings.   
 




Strength: Not measurable. CF Mils Pers Instr 01/20 was not finalized and 
issued until the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) expanded DAOD 5019-0 to 
include stronger regulations for hateful conduct. There is limited scope to 
gauge CAF’s willingness to implement the regulation but public statements 
in response to several high-profile RWE infractions since the regulation was 
adopted indicate the CAF will use the regulation with routine application.  
 
DAOD 5019-0 (Military Regulation) 
Strength Test #1: 
RWE Litmus Test 
 
Strength: Moderate. Language is broad enough in scope that it can cover 
supremacist, nativist, and fundamentalist forms of RWE. Does not address 
anti-government, militia, patriot movement RWE.  
 
Strength Test #2: 
Mechanism / 
Pathway to Act 
 
Strength: Strong. While portions of the regulation set a normative standard, 
the regulation outlines administrative, disciplinary, and potential 
legal/punitive actions that can result from non-compliance with the policy.  
 




Strength: Not measurable. DAOD 5019-0 was not updated with expanded 
“hateful conduct” language addressing extremism activities until July 2020. 
However, since its enactment, the Defence Ministry has displaced a high-
level of organizational willingness to implement the policy because of 
several high-profile RWE incidents in 2020 and ongoing cases of 




Table 21. Germany Process Model Testing 
Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Right-Wing Extremism: Signs, Symbols, and Banned 
Organisations (Government Policy) 
Strength Test #1: 
RWE Litmus Test 
 
Strength: Weak. Only addresses supremacist and nativist RWE. Does not 
contain language recognizing fundamentalist or anti-government, militia, 
patriot movement RWE.  
 
Strength Test #2: 
Mechanism / 
Pathway to Act 
 
Strength: Moderate. Articulates all relevant statutory regulations in German 
criminal code that are applicable to RWE infractions involved in the display 




list of all organizations and political parties Germany has designed as 
unconstitutional as a result of right-wing (National Socialist) beliefs. 
However, as a government policy does not account for any administrative 
actions available to the state to handle infractions below the level of 
criminal charges.  
 




Strength: Moderate. The German government, responsible for the 
punishment of German soldiers found in criminal violation of regulations 
restricting association with RWE due to the nature of the military court 
system, routinely investigates and acts against known cases of RWE. For 
infractions falling below the threshold of criminal charges, German military 
has an intermittent history of addressing RWE infractions but due to a series 
of high-profile RWE infractions over the last three years, has increased its 
implementation of regulations. 
 
German Criminal Code, 1998 (Criminal Code) 
Strength Test #1: 
RWE Litmus Test 
 
Strength: Not applicable. Sections of German criminal code variously 
address different forms of RWE through treason and sedition, incitement to 
hatred, use of symbols and dissemination of propaganda of unconstitutional 
organizations, and terrorism clauses. While language specifically 
recognizes a “former National Socialist party” as unconstitutional, 
identifying supremacist RWE, the overall language of German criminal 
code is broad and generalized for maximum legal application.  
 
Strength Test #2: 
Mechanism / 
Pathway to Act 
 
Strength: Not applicable, as criminal code constitutes a mechanism or 
pathway to act. However, because Germany does not have a separate 
military criminal court system much like other Western democracies 
(instead, it has a system of “troop service courts” which adjudicate 
disciplinary or lesser administrative infractions), infractions involving RWE 
may be dealt with directly in the German criminal justice system because of 
Germany’s unique statutory provisions regarding unconstitutional 
organizations.  
 




Strength: Moderate. The German state has displayed a routine willingness 
to implement German criminal code against soldiers who commit 
infractions meeting the threshold of criminal charges, however the German 
military has only recently taken a stronger stance on dealing with RWE in 
the ranks as a result of scandals. The German Military Counterintelligence 
Service (MAD) has significantly expanded its number of investigations into 
soldiers with suspected RWE ties or beliefs since 2017, however it is 
unclear how many of MAD’s positive identification of RWE cases are 
resulting in separations or referrals to the German criminal justice system 
(Center for Analysis of the Radical Right 2020; Bundesamt für den 






Appendix D: Content Analysis Code Tree 
Table 22. Content Analysis Code Tree and Legend 
Primary Content 
Reference to RWE 
Child Code: Anti-Government / Patriot / Militia RWE 
Child Code: Does not define RWE/treats as blanket term 
Child Code: Does not refer to Anti-Government / Patriot / Militia RWE 
Child Code: Does not refer to Fundamentalist RWE 
Child Code: Does not refer to Nativist / Anti-Foreign RWE 
Child Code: Fundamentalist RWE 
Child Code: Nativist / Anti-Foreign RWE 
Child Code: Racist / Supremacist RWE 
Definition of RWE activity or association 
Child Code: Does not include physical action / conduct 
Child Code: Does not include speech / dialogue 
Child Code: Includes physical actions / conduct and speech / dialogue 
Child Code: Only refers to hate crime 
Child Code: Only refers to hate speech activities or dissemination 
Child Code: Only refers to radicalisation 
Child Code: Only refers to terrorism 
Definition of RWE target  
Child Code: Does not include fundamentalism 
Child Code: Does not include nativism  
Child Code: Does not include racism / supremacism 
Child Code: Does not include sedition, treason 
Child Code: Includes racism / supremacism, nativism (anti-foreign stances), 
fundamentalism, and sedition  
Identifies RWE tattoos as prohibited 
Defines activity or association with extremism in non-specific terms 
Child Code: Refers to physical actions / speech / dialogue 
Secondary Content 
Articulates RWE infraction handling process 
Articulates punishment or consequences for involvement in extremism 
Implicit bias  
Child Code: Islamist extremism focused 
Child Code: Refers only to hate speech / dialogue 
Weak language / optionality language 
Child Code: Distancing language that frames RWE as less of a domestic issue 




Does not identify the military as a sector/institution at risk of radicalisation 
Strict use of terrorism language / suggests extremism and terrorism interchangeable 
Child Code: Refers to extremism but retains a primary focus on terrorism as root issue 
Terrorism used as blanket term 
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